Arise Bharat

Author : Col. Ajay Kumar (retd)

The geopolitical churn unfolding across West Asia and the Horn of Africa is no longer a distant regional contest. It is a direct strategic variable shaping Bharat’s energy security, trade routes, diaspora safety, and diplomatic credibility. Once a manageable balance between Gulf partners, is rapidly turning into an unstable rivalry with consequences that will spill into BRICS, the Red Sea, Africa, and India’s western maritime flank.

As Bharat assumes the BRICS chairmanship in 2026, it inherits a grouping that now includes not only its traditional partners but also rival powers locked in open competition: Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Egypt and Ethiopia, Iran and the Gulf states. Extending beyond abstract disagreements,  these are now kinetic, resource-driven, and increasingly militarised contests playing out from Yemen to Sudan, from Libya to the Nile Basin.

For New Delhi, this moment demands more than diplomatic finesse. It requires strategic recalibration grounded in realism.

A Rivalry That Has Turned Kinetic

For over a decade, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were seen as the stabilising axis of the Gulf. That partnership is now fracturing into a zero-sum competition for regional primacy. The rivalry is no longer confined to economic competition or ideological differences. It is playing out through armed proxies and rival political orders across Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and the Horn of Africa.

In Yemen, the split is unmistakable. Riyadh backs the internationally recognised Presidential Leadership Council and seeks to preserve a unitary Yemeni state that does not threaten Saudi border security or energy infrastructure. Abu Dhabi, by contrast, supports the Southern Transitional Council and has built a network of local militias controlling ports, islands, and shipping lanes along the Bab el-Mandeb.

This is not a peripheral theatre. The Red Sea corridor carries the bulk of India’s westbound trade. Any sustained disruption to Bab el-Mandeb affects Indian exports, shipping insurance, energy supplies, and logistics costs. The longer this rivalry deepens, the higher the risk to India’s maritime lifelines.

Africa as the New Proxy Arena

The Saudi–UAE contest has expanded across the Red Sea into Africa, turning fragile states into proxy battlegrounds.

In Sudan, the civil war has effectively become a Gulf proxy conflict. Saudi Arabia and Egypt back the Sudanese Armed Forces as the last remaining institutional pillar of the state. The UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary network embedded in gold smuggling, mercenary operations, and cross-border arms trafficking.

Sudan now risks permanent fragmentation. A collapsed Sudan destabilises the entire Red Sea basin, from Egypt’s southern border to Ethiopia’s western frontier, and creates new corridors for weapons, extremists, and organised crime.

Libya tells a similar story. Competing Gulf alignments have hardened the country’s division into rival political entities. Local warlords exploit these rivalries for funding and weapons. The longer this continues, the further Libya drifts from any unified political settlement.

For India, these African theatres matter for three reasons. First, they sit astride critical maritime routes. Second, they affect energy and commodity flows. Third, they shape the security environment along India’s western seaboard.

Egypt and Ethiopia: A Second Axis of Conflict

Running parallel to the Gulf rivalry is another fault line with equally serious implications: the Nile dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has fundamentally altered the balance of power in the Nile Basin. Ethiopia now controls the flow of the Blue Nile, the source of most of Egypt’s water. For Cairo, this is not an environmental concern; it is a national survival issue.

Egypt’s water security underpins its agriculture, food supply, employment, and political stability. Any disruption threatens internal unrest in a country of more than 100 million people sitting astride the Suez Canal.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, sees the dam as the foundation of its industrial future and regional leadership.

This dispute is now being drawn into Gulf politics. Saudi Arabia aligns closely with Egypt’s position. The UAE, while publicly supporting Arab consensus, is one of Ethiopia’s largest investors and a key diplomatic partner. Abu Dhabi has quietly facilitated Ethiopia’s search for alternative sea access via Somaliland, angering both Egypt and Somalia.

Once again, rival BRICS members are backing opposing sides of an existential conflict.

BRICS: Expansion Has Imported Rivalries

The expansion of BRICS has added economic weight and geopolitical relevance. It has also imported unresolved rivalries into the heart of the grouping.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE sit on opposite sides of multiple regional conflicts. Egypt and Ethiopia are locked in a hydro-political standoff. Iran remains in confrontation with Gulf states. China is deeply embedded across all these theatres.

This creates a fundamental challenge for a consensus-based forum. BRICS was built as a platform for economic coordination and Global South representation. It was not designed to manage security rivalries of this scale.

If bilateral disputes begin spilling into BRICS deliberations, the grouping risks paralysis. For Bharat, as chair, the danger is reputational as much as institutional. A fractured BRICS under Indian stewardship weakens New Delhi’s credibility as a bridge-builder and agenda-setter.

Turkey and China Are Already Moving In

The vacuum is being filled. Turkey has expanded aggressively across Africa and the Red Sea basin through security cooperation, drone diplomacy, intelligence partnerships, and political mediation. Its role in reshaping alignments in the Horn of Africa has already undercut Egyptian and Gulf manoeuvring.

China has gone further by institutionalising its diplomatic presence through the International Organization for Mediation. This gives Beijing a legal and diplomatic architecture to manage disputes, protect Belt and Road investments, and project itself as a conflict manager for the Global South.

While Bharat remains respected as a development partner, it is not yet seen as a security or mediation actor in these theatres. That gap is widening.

Why This Matters for Bharat

West Asia and the Horn of Africa are not optional theatres for Indian diplomacy.

More than sixty percent of Bharat’s oil imports pass through this region. Nearly all westbound maritime trade crosses Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Over nine million Bharatiyas live and work across the Gulf and East Africa.

Any prolonged instability directly affects Bharat’s economy. The rerouting of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope following Red Sea attacks has already increased freight costs, insurance premiums, and delivery timelines. Bharatiya exporters are among the hardest hit.

A widening Saudi–UAE confrontation, combined with Sudan’s collapse and Nile instability, would create a permanent arc of disruption stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.

Bharat cannot afford strategic passivity.

The Forced Choice Problem

For decades, New Delhi balanced relations across West Asia through strategic autonomy. That balance is now under strain.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are no longer aligned. Egypt and Ethiopia are strategic rivals. Iran remains isolated. Turkey and China are expanding influence.

At some point, Bharat will face pressure to choose — on investments, defence cooperation, port access, infrastructure projects, and diplomatic alignments.

This is not ideological. It is structural. The old model of equidistance is becoming harder to sustain when partners are openly working at cross-purposes.

Recalibrating Bharat’s West Asia Strategy

Bharat’s response should be rooted in realism, not nostalgia for non-alignment.

First, New Delhi must treat the Red Sea and western Indian Ocean as a primary strategic theatre.

Second, it must deepen high-level political engagement with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi while clearly signalling that instability in Yemen, Sudan, and Libya directly affects Indian interests.

Third, Bharat should quietly explore a facilitation role within BRICS — not as a mediator imposing solutions, but as an agenda-setter that keeps economic cooperation insulated from political rivalries.

Fourth, maritime security cooperation must expand beyond patrols into intelligence sharing, logistics access, and port partnerships across the Red Sea and East Africa.

Finally, Bharat must invest diplomatic capital in Africa not only as a development partner but as a long-term security stakeholder.

A Strategic Test for 2026

Bharat’s BRICS chairmanship comes at a moment when the Global South is divided by competing ambitions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are building rival regional orders. Egypt and Ethiopia are locked in a struggle over water and survival. Turkey and China are shaping new mediation architectures. Africa is becoming the new chessboard of great power competition. This is the geopolitical environment in which Bharat must operate.

The challenge is not to moralise these conflicts or seek rhetorical leadership. The challenge is to protect Bharat’s trade routes, energy flows, diaspora, and strategic credibility.

West Asia’s tensions are no longer someone else’s problem. They are now part of Bharat’s strategic reality. And BRICS 2026 will be the first real test of whether New Delhi is ready to act accordingly.